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Abstract
Because preferences naturally arise and play an important role in many
real-life decisions, they are at the backbone of various fields. In particular
preferences are increasingly used in almost all matching procedures-based
applications. In this work we highlight the benefit of using AI insights
on preferences in a large scale application, namely the French Admission
Post-Baccalaure´at Platform (APB). Each year APB allocates hundreds of
thousands first year applicants to universities. This is done automatically
by matching applicants preferences to university seats. In practice, APB
can be unable to distinguish between applicants which leads to the intro-
duction of random selection. This has created frustration in the French
public since randomness, even used as a last mean does not fare well with
the republican egalitarian principle. In this work, we provide a solution
to this problem. We take advantage of recent AI Preferences Theory re-
sults to show how to enhance APB in order to improve expressiveness of
applicants preferences and reduce their exposure to random decisions.
Keywords: Preferences, Stable marriage
1 Introduction
Preferences are everywhere in our daily lives. They occur as soon as we are
faced with a choice problem, e.g., “which ice cream flavor would you prefer?”,
“which investment funds would you choose?”, etc. Among multiple choices, it
is often necessary to identify one or more choices that are more appealing than
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
7.
07
29
8v
3 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 25
 M
ar 
20
19
others. Preference is inherently a multidisciplinary topic which brings together
artificial intelligence researchers, philosophers, psychologists, economists, opera-
tions researchers, etc. In particular, preferences are becoming of greater interest
in many areas in artificial intelligence, such as non-monotonic reasoning, multi-
agent systems, constraint satisfaction, decision making, social choice theory and
decision-theoretic planning.
The last two decades have seen a widespread number of efforts dedicated to
the problems of preferences in artificial intelligence ranging from their elicitation
and representation to reasoning with/about preferences [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. More
recently, we have witnessed an increasing interest in exploiting AI advances on
preferences in other disciplines e.g. databases [6, 7, 8] and game theory [9].
There are still many domains where preferences techniques are integrated in a
very primitive and naive way. This is the case in the French Admission Post-
Baccalaure´at Platform (APB)1. And in this work, our goal is to highlight the
benefits of using AI insights in that large scale application.
The Baccalaure´at is an academic qualification which French students take
at the end of high school. It was introduced by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1808. It
is the main diploma required to pursue university studies. Since its inception,
the number of laureates has dramatically increased, from 31 bacheliers in 1809
to 632,700 in 2016, which have to choose between more than 12,000 university
studies [10, 11]. These numbers, combined to the limited capacity of most
universities make assignment procedures challenging. To make things worst, the
vast majority of French universities have to respect a non-selection principle
which forbids the filtering of applicants based on their previous high school
results, Baccalaure´at options or motivation letters.
The adopted strategy exploits applicants expressed preferences to create
institutions preferences. The idea is for an institution to prefer applicants who
highly ranked it in their preferences list. This mechanism, along the collection of
applicants preferences, and the execution of matching algorithms is implemented
by the Admission Post-Baccalaure´at Platform. In practice, APB can be unable
to distinguish between applicants. This is the case when they rank-order a study
at the same level. APB’s solution is to randomly order equivalent applicants in
its preferences lists. Randomness, even used as a last mean does not fare well
with the republican egalitarian principle, especially when it affects an institution
like the bac. Once officially acknowledged by the education minister, it has
created frustration for the students and their parents, and as a consequence the
education ministry has fixed an objective of reducing the use of randomness in
APB [12].
In this work, our aim is to tackle this problem and to provide concrete so-
lutions to restrict the use of randomness in APB. We thoroughly analyse the
APB platform and provide concrete improvements inspired by recent AI Prefer-
ence Theory results. We show how and where APB can be fixed to implement
our solutions and improve the performances of its allocation procedures. In
particular, our work offers three benefits:
1https://www.admission-postbac.fr/
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1. allow more flexibility for applicants to express their preferences (aiming
for a better embedding of preferences),
2. allow applicants to delay their definite preferences,
3. reduce exposure to random decisions in matching algorithms.
The presentation is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give necessary
background. Section 3 fully describes the APB algorithms and processes along
general information on its practical use and perception. In Section 4, we show
how to extend APB to improve preferences expressiveness, allow applicants to
delay their definite preferences and reduce exposure to random decision making.
Before giving a general conclusion in Section 6, Section 5 presents the related
work.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Preferences Modeling
Preferences modeling is based on a finite set of objects, denoted by O, to be
compared or evaluated [13]. The basic ingredient in this framework is a binary
relation, denoted by , over O. The notation o  o′ stands for “o is at least as
preferred as o′”. Thus  is referred to as preference relation.
Given a preference relation  and two objects o, o′ ∈ O, we distinguish
between three relations over o and o′:
• o is strictly preferred to o′, denoted by o  o′, when o  o′ holds but
o′  o does not.  is called a strict preference relation.
• o is indifferent to o′, denoted by o ≈ o′, when both o  o′ and o′  o hold.
≈ is called an indifference relation.
• o is incomparable to o′, denoted by o ∼ o′, when neither o  o′ nor o′  o
holds.
∼ is called an incomparability relation.
Let us now recall some basic properties concerning binary relations.
•  is reflexive if and only if ∀o ∈ O, o  o.
•  is irreflexive if and only if ∀o ∈ O, o  o does not hold.
•  is complete if and only if ∀o, o′ ∈ O, we have o  o′ or o′  o.
•  is transitive if and only if ∀o, o′, o′′ ∈ O, if o  o′ and o′  o′′ then
o  o′′.
•  is symmetric if and only if ∀o, o′ ∈ O, if o  o′ then o′  o.
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•  is antisymmetric if and only if ∀o ∈ O, ∀o′ ∈ O\{o}, we have not(o 
o′ and o′  o).
•  is asymmetric if and only if ∀o, o′ ∈ O, we have not(o  o′ and o′  o).
Given the properties of a preference relation , we distinguish between dif-
ferent types of preference structures. For the work presented here, we need to
recall two structures:
• A total preorder: this corresponds to a reflexive, complete and transitive
preference relation . The associated incomparability relation is empty.
When  is antisymmetric, ≈ is the set of pairs (o, o) and the preference
structure is called a total order. Lastly, when  is asymmetric, ≈ is empty
and the preference structure is called a strict total order.
• A partial preorder: this corresponds to a reflexive and transitive prefer-
ence relation . The associated incomparability relation is not empty.
When  is antisymmetric, ≈ is composed of pairs (o, o) only and the pref-
erence structure is called a partial order. Lastly, when  is asymmetric,
≈ is empty and the preference structure is called a strict partial order.
A preference relation  is cyclic if and only if its induced strict preference
relation  is cyclic, i.e., there exists a chain of objects o, · · · , o′ such that
o  · · ·  o′  o. Otherwise  is acyclic.
From now on, we suppose that  is transitive. By abuse of language we
sometimes say that  is a total or partial (pre)order or (strict) total or partial
(pre)order. When no confusion is possible, an order is equivalently denoted by
 or .
When the preference relation  is a total preorder, the indifference relation
≈ induced by  is an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetric and transitive).
The set of equivalence classes of O given ≈ is totally ordered w.r.t. . Let
E1, · · · , En be the set of equivalence classes induced by ≈. Then,
(i) ∀i = 1, · · · , n, Ei 6= ∅,
(ii) E1 ∪ · · · ∪ En = O,
(iii) ∀i, j, Ei ∩ Ej = ∅ for i 6= j,
(iv) ∀o, o′ ∈ Ei, o ≈ o′.
(E1, · · · , En) is an ordered partition of O given  iff (∀o, o′ ∈ O, o ∈ Ei, o′ ∈ Ej
with i < j if and only if o  o′).
Example 1 Let O = {o0, o1, o2, o3} be a set of objects. Let  be a total preorder
over O defined by o1  o3, o3 ≈ o0 and o3  o2. Then, the ordered partition of
O is (E1, E2, E3) with E1 = {o1}, E2 = {o0, o3} and E3 = {o2}.
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A total order can also be written as an ordered partition of O where each
equivalence class is composed of a single object.
Note that an ordered partition of O associated with  is acyclic. For exam-
ple, the preference relation o1  o2, o2  o3, o3  o2 and o3  o4 cannot be
written in terms of an ordered partition.
Let  and ′ be two preference relations. We say that  extends ′ if and
only if ∀o, o′ ∈ O, if o ′ o′ then o  o′.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued)
Let ′: o1  o0, o1  o3  o2. Then : o1  o3, o3 ≈ o0, o3  o2 extends ′.
2.2 Matching Algorithms
The Stable Marriage Problem (SMP) aims at finding a matching between 2n
women and men, using preferences lists (strict total orders) in which each person
has expressed her preference over the members of the opposite gender. The
matching must be stable which means that there is no married pair that would
be individually better off than they are with the element to which they are
currently matched.
This problem was first described by D. Gale and L. Shapley as a special case
of the more general College Admission problem [14]. In this seminal work, it is
shown that it is always possible to solve the SMP and make all marriages stable
using an O(n2) procedure presented in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm runs a sequence of proposals, and at each point in the process,
each person is either engaged or free. Assuming proposals from men to woman,
each man may alternate between being engaged and being free. If a man is
engaged more than one time, his successive partners are less and less desirable.
Once a woman is engaged, she will never be free again. She remains engaged,
possibly with different partners.
In each sequence, a free man m can propose the woman w at the top of
his preference list. If w is free, she becomes engaged. If her current partner
m′ is such that m′  m in her preference list, she remains engaged with him.
Otherwise, she engages with m, and m′ is freed. The process stops when all
men are engaged and returns a list of n engagements. The solution is stable
otherwise there are a non paired man m and woman w who prefer each other
over their partners. If this was the case, m would have proposed w before his
current partner, which gives a chance to w to have engaged m before rejecting
him, and therefore there is a man m′ that she prefers to him.
Remark that the algorithm is optimal for those who propose but not neces-
sarily for those who choose, i.e., Algorithm 1 respects men preferences best.
Example 3 (Borrowed from [14]) Let α, β and γ be three men, and A, B
and C be three women. Table 1 gives men and women preferences. For each
pair (a, b) in the table a refers to the ranking of the woman by the man and b
given the ranking of the man by the women. For example α prefers A first, B
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Data: M list of n men, W list of n women
Result: P set of n engagements
begin
Initialize all m ∈M and w ∈W to free
Initialize P to ∅
while ∃ a free man m who still has a woman w to propose to do
if w is free then
// m and w become engaged
add (m,w) to P
else
// some pair (m′, w) already exists
if w prefers m to m′ then
// m and w become engaged
remove (m′, w) from P
m′ becomes free
add (m,w) to P
else
// m′ and w remain engaged
end
end
end
return P
end
Algorithm 1: Gale and Shapley Stable Marriage
A B C
α (1,3) (2,2) (3,1)
β (3,1) (1,3) (2,2)
γ (2,2) (3,1) (1,3)
Table 1: Example of Stable Marriage
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second and C third, while B prefers γ first, α second and β third.
Three stable marriages are possible: P1 = {(γ,A), (α,B), (β,C)},
P2 = {(α,A), (β,B), (γ,C)} and P3 = {(β,A), (γ,B), (α,C)}. In P1 both men
and women have their second choice. In P2 men have their first choice while in
P3 women have their first choice. Algorithm 1 returns P2 as it gives priority to
men.
3 The Admission Post-Baccalaure´at Platform
3.1 An Interactive Process
The post-Baccalaure´at platform manages the interaction between applicants
and institutions. It allows the collect of their preferences, and executes different
allocation algorithms in an interactive multi stages process which run between
January and July each year. The algorithms consider three classes of studies:
selective, non selective with limited capacity, and unlimited capacity. The APB
process is described in Figure 1. It follows three main steps:
Step 1: [Applicants’ preferences] Applicants express their preferences by
means of a ranked list (strict total order) of wishes of studies, called pref-
erences lists. Then the APB platform sends applicants academic records
to selective studies (if any) for which they would have applied.
Step 2: [Institutions’ preferences] Three classes of studies are considered:
Selective studies: An institution with a selective study establishes
a rank-ordered list (strict total order) of applicants according to its
own criteria and based on applicants academic records.
Studies with limited capacity: These institutions create their prefer-
ences by using applicants preferences. They give priority to appli-
cants preferring them first. This is the only legal way to distinguish
between applicants in order to respect limited capacity constraints.
The top-k applicants are accepted until capacity is reached. The algo-
rithm used to create institutions’ preferences is described in Section
3.2.
Studies with unlimited capacity: All applications are accepted.
For each wish expressed in an applicant’s preferences list given in Step
1, we have four possible answers: (1) Accepted wish, (2) Application not
yet accepted, (3) Wish not proposed because of a better ranked proposed
wish, and (4) Rejected applicant.
Step 3: [Allocation proposals] Students are asked to accept (or not) pro-
posed assignments (called proposals). APB makes proposals to applicants
in three rounds. Only one proposal is offered to applicants in each round.
APB takes into account:
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Figure 1: The Admission Post-Baccalaure´at Platform (APB). (source: Ministry
of National Education, France)
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• Applicants preferences lists.
• Preferences lists established by institutions with selective studies or
studies with limited capacity.
• and, from round 2, positions released by other applicants in previous
rounds.
Four possible answers are offered to applicants:
• Definitely Yes: The applicant definitely accepts the proposal. There-
fore,
– no other proposal will be made for the applicant in subsequent
rounds,
– if the applicant gives up this accepted proposal later in the pro-
cess then she has to resign.
• Yes but: The applicant accepts for the moment the proposal with
the hope of getting a better proposal in subsequent rounds (i.e. she
will be possibly offered a better ranked wish in subsequent rounds).
Therefore, if in a subsequent round the applicant is offered a better
ranked wish then the previous proposal is definitely deleted.
• No but: The applicant refuses the proposal but maintains her appli-
cations for better ranked wishes. Therefore, the refused proposal is
definitely deleted.
• Resign: The applicant gives up (renounces) all her applications.
3.2 Use of Matching Algorithms in the APB platform
The Stable Marriage procedure presented in Section 2 is used to match ap-
plicants to institutions for both Selective and Non Selective Limited Capacity
Studies. The APB’s implementation of this procedure is institution-proposing,
i.e., it respects institutions preferences best2.
Selective Studies can enforce their own criterion to rank-order applicants.
The SM procedure is then fed with the preferences of the institutions and pref-
erences of the applicants.
On the other hand, institutions running Non Selective Limited Capacity
Studies are not legally allowed to filter applicants based on their previous high
school results, Baccalaure´at options or motivation letters. Still, their limited
capacity requires some selection process. This is done by using applicants pref-
erences to create the preferences lists of institutions. More concretely, it starts
by first giving priority to applicants of the study academy. These are appli-
cants who take their Baccalaure´at in the academy and/or live in the academy.
These applicants are then rank-ordered according to their preferences expressed
in Step 1. The higher ranked a study in an applicant’s preferences list, the
better the applicant rank is for this particular study. Then applicants outside
2Julien Grenet, personal communication.
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of the academy are considered. Before we formally describe the APB algorithm,
we present two notions used in the algorithm namely absolute rank wish and
relative rank wish. An absolute wish refers to the rank of the study in the ap-
plicant preferences list. As studies are grouped into families, a relative wish
corresponds to the rank of a given study w.r.t. studies pertaining to the same
family. An example is given below.
Example 4 Suppose we have the following preferences list of a given applicant:
Wish 1: Ecole Pre´pa Lyce´e 1 (CPGE)
Wish 2: Licence Physique (LMD)
Wish 3: Ecole Pre´pa Lyce´e 2 (CPGE)
Wish 4: Licence Maths (LMD)
Licence Maths is fourth in absolute ranking and second in relative (LMD)
ranking.
We can remark that the distinction between absolute and relative ranking
is a naive way to approximate incomparability between groups of objects. See
Section 2.
Algorithm 2 presents this processing. It is based on the description given by
the French ministry of education [15]. It exploits absolute and relative ranks to
separate applicants and create for each study a totally ordered preferences list.
The method iterates over institutions and their studies, successively consid-
ering local and non local applicants. It creates sets locals (resp. nonLocals) of
equivalents applicants, i.e., members of a set have ranked the considered study
at the same relative and absolute ranks. Each set is transposed into a randList
list data structure which randomly orders applicants. This local list is then ap-
pended to the study’s Selected list. This structure gives for each study a totally
ordered list of selected applicants.
3.3 Practical Usage and Perception
In 2015, 788,000 applicants used the APB platform3 to select among more than
12,000 studies. Among them, 38% put a non selective limited capacity study as
their first wish. Overall, in the first admission stage, 60% obtained their first
wish, 14% their second, and 8% their third. On average, applicants put 6.6
wishes in their preferences list. That year, random choices were used to meet
capacity constraints on the first wish for 190 studies [12].
While the selection principle used in selective institutions is commonly agreed
on (it is based on applicants high school results), studies with limited capacity
3A 5% increase against the previous year.
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Data: Institutions, list of institutions
Result: For each study s belonging to some institution i, s.Selected
preferences list of applicants
begin
for i ∈ Institutions do
for s ∈ i.Studies do
for r ∈ 1 .. 24 do // relative ordering
for a ∈ 1 .. 24 do // absolute ordering
locals = {app ∈ s.Applicants s.t.
app.Academy = i.Academy and
app.relative(s) = r and app.absolute(s) = a}
randList = randomSort(locals)
add(s.Selected, randList)
end
end
for r ∈ 1 .. 24 do // relative ordering
for a ∈ 1 .. 24 do // absolute ordering
nonLocals = {app ∈ s.Applicants s.t.
app.Academy 6= i.Academy and
app.relative(s) = r and app.absolute(s) = a}
randList = randomSort(nonLocals)
add(s.Selected, randList)
end
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 2: Create Institutions Preferences
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have engendered doubts, incomprehension and even polemics. This is because
on the one hand such studies can not legally select applicants on the basis of
their results or motivation letters but on the other hand, due to the limited
capacity constraint, they need to rank-order applicants in order to fulfil this
constraint [16]. The ministry has responded to specify that priority is given to
applicants of the academy and to ensure that applicants preferences are then
used in order to have a first ranking. As described in Section 3.2, when this is
not enough to meet the capacity constraint, the algorithm uses random choices
between equivalent candidates.
Reacting to the pressure of parents, student associations and their lawyers,
the ministry has recently released the portion of the source code concerning
studies with limited capacity [17, 18]. In the light of this code it appears that
all is not described in the algorithm given above and officially specified in [15].
For example applicants who passed their Baccalaure´at abroad are processed
first, which gives them absolute priority over all other applicants. This fact was
never documented or presented by the ministry before.
As we have previously stressed, rank-ordering applicants in studies with lim-
ited capacity is troubling for applicants. In the light of comments posted on the
net, the use of randomness and the fact that such studies consider applicants
preferences to provide their rank-ordering generate frustration and incompre-
hension:
• “If I am told that my future is based on chance, I would be surprised.”
• “Should I first put the study that I really like, or the one where I have
better chance of entering?”
• “Do I have a chance of getting a place in a selective study, or in this study
with limited capacity located in another academy than that where I pass
my bac?”
• “What is the weight of my wish number 1 if it concerns studies with limited
capacity?”
• “I do not understand why only the best wishes are offered to the candidates.
Why is it not possible to be offered all top-k (e.g. top-3) wishes?”
4 Preference Reasoning in Matching Procedures:
Application to the Admission Post-Baccalaure´at
Platform
In APB applicants must provide a rank-order (preferences list) over (maximally)
24 studies. This rank-order is a strict total order. This has the unfortunate
consequence to force applicants distinguish between all rank-ordered studies
which might not be faithful to real applicants’ preferences.
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In the following we show how a forced linearizing of preferences and random
decisions can lead to sub optimal allocation of applicants to institutions. At
contrary, we show how the introduction of partial preorders:
1. gives applicants more expressiveness in their wishes,
2. allow applicants to delay their definite preferences, and
3. reduce exposure to random decisions in matching algorithms.
4.1 The Benefits of Partial Ordering
From the analysis of the APB source code for non selective limited capacity
studies, it appears that the algorithm is successively executed for each study to
produce a ranked list of candidates. Those ranked lists are then used to define
institutions/studies’ preferences in the Gale and Shapley algorithm.
Example 5 Suppose we have two studies, S1 and S2 with limited capacity equal
to 1, and a third study S3 with unlimited capacity. All these studies are located
in the same academy A. Suppose we have two candidates C1 and C2 in the
academy A having the following true preferences lists:
C1 : S1  S2  S3
C2 : S1  S3, S2  S3
APB forces the use of strict total orders, and let us assume that as a conse-
quence, C2 decides for S1  S2  S3. From now on, the two candidates become
indistinguishable for the algorithms. They have the same preferences and live
in the same academy. We show below how this leads to sub optimal decisions.
Limited capacity studies S1 and S2 have C1 and C2 as candidates. They
apply the algorithm given in Section 3.2, and randomly order candidates. Let
us assume that S1 preferences list is C2  C1, and that S2’s list is C1  C2.
The Stable Marriage algorithm (see Algorithm 1) will propose its first choice
to each institution, resulting in S1 selecting C2 and S2 selecting C1. This means
that C1 has her second wish and C2 her first one.
Now let us assume that partial orders are introduced in APB. This allows
C2 to use her true preferences, S1  S3, S2  S3.
1. While creating the preferences list for S1, we can now distinguish between
C1 and C2, indeed, the second candidate has two top-level wishes while the
first candidate has only one. In this case it is reasonable for S1 to give
priority to C1.
2. While creating preferences for S2, C2 is preferred to C1.
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With these new preferences lists, the Stable Marriage procedure can now al-
locate applicants to institutions: C1 to S1, and C2 to S2. This time the solution
gives her first wish to each applicant, and randomness does not impact the se-
lection process.
We can now introduce a third candidate C3 from the same academy A. We
have:
C1 : S1  S2  S3
C2 : S1  S3, S2  S3
C3 : S2  S1  S3
This time the rational is for S2 to give priority to C3, and as a consequence,
allocate C2 to S3. Again, this is done without using randomness.
In this example, we have seen that partial orders allowed to more finely
distinguish between applicants, and as a consequence, saved the process from
random decisions. Partial preorders allow to have ties in applicants preferences
which offers more flexibility and allows a better assignment of applicants.
However, we have also seen that by using a tie in her preferences, C2 is
paying the price of being considered after applicants able to express more
specific choices. This priority is coherent with AI principles in preferences
handling which give priority to more specific preferences [19, 20, 21]. More-
over this priority is intuitively meaningful. In fact indifference/incomparability
reflects weak preference. Therefore the less an applicant expresses indiffer-
ence/incomparability, the more specific her preferences are; thus she deserves
to get precedence over less specific applicants.
Now since the relaxed preferences expressed by an applicant helped the sys-
tem to minimize the impact of random decisions, we need to give the latter a
concrete personal benefit. We propose, when possible, to provide those appli-
cants with the multiple allocation choices in their relaxed constraints. Going
back to the previous example, and this time assuming institutions with capacity
set to 2. C2, would be proposed to choose between a seat in S1 or in S2. This
introduces the possibility of a delayed-choice in the APB process. As presented
before, initial preferences are expressed in January, and allocations proposed in
June-July (see Section 3.1). One can assume that those months could autho-
rize the applicant to refine her thinking and hopefully be able to finally decide
between several allocations.
4.2 Dealing with Partially Ordered Students’ Preferences
We have stressed in the previous section the advantage of offering more flex-
ibility for applicants in expressing their preferences. In particular we do aim
at allowing applicants to express their preferences in the form of partial pre-
orders, namely applicants are allowed to express that some studies are equally
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desired. The example provided in the previous sub-Section suggests that when
a study is considering applicants, knowing that some of these applicants have
other equally preferred studies allows to more finely distinguish applicants, and
as a consequence minimize the impact of randomness.
More generally, at each step of the algorithm we rank-order the list of appli-
cants who rank-ordered the study at hand (ri, aj), where ri and aj respectively
stand for ‘relative rank i” and “absolute rank j”, according to the number
of studies that they have rank-ordered (ri, aj). The smaller is the number,
the better rank-ordered the applicant is. Lastly, randomness is used as an
extreme mean to break ties on applicants having the same number of (ri, aj)-
rank-ordered studies. Returning to Example 5, precedence is given to C1 over
C2 because the former has only one wish, namely S1 which is rank-ordered (1, 1)
while the latter has two studies, namely S1 and S2 that are rank-ordered (1, 1).
Technically speaking, given applicant’s preferences in the form of a partial
preorder we need to know the rank of each study w.r.t. that partial preorder.
In Example 5, S1 and S2 needed to know which studies are rank-ordered first
by C1 and C2. These studies are {S1} and {S1, S2} respectively.
The idea behind this reasoning is to linearize the partial preorder in or-
der to rank-order equivalence classes. Consider again Example 5 and appli-
cant C2. We have that S1 and S2 are rank-ordered first (meant to have an
equal preference for C2) and S3 second. This rank-order is a total preorder,
t= (E1, E2) = ({S1, S2}, {S3}), which extends the initial partial order pro-
vided by C2.
4.2.1 Optimistic vs Pessimistic Reasoning
We may have multiple total preorders extending a partial preorder. The better
is to deal with only one such a total preorder in order to guarantee a robust
treatment of applicants’ preferences [20]. For this purpose we will use insights
from non-monotonic reasoning [22] which are referred to as optimistic reasoning
and pessimistic reasoning [4]. More precisely we distinguish between the follow-
ing two ways of constructing a total preorder which extends a partial preorder.
Let t= (E1, · · · , En) the total preorder extending a partial preorder p over
a set of objects O.
1. Optimistic reasoning:
Put in E1 objects in O which are not strictly less preferred to any other
object in O w.r.t. p. Remove elements of E1 from O. Repeat this
process until O is empty. Then, t= (E1, · · · , En).
2. Pessimistic reasoning:
Put in E′1 objects in O which are not strictly preferred to any other object
in O w.r.t. p. Remove elements of E′1 from O. Repeat this process until
O is empty. Then, t= (E1, · · · , En) = (E′n, · · · , E′1).
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Example 6 Let O = {a, b, c, d, e} be a set of objects. Let p: a  b, c  d  e.
Following optimistic reasoning we have t= (E1, E2, E3) = ({a, c}, {b, d}, {e}).
Following pessimistic reasoning we have t= (E1, E2, E3) = ({c}, {a, d}, {b, e}).
It has been shown that the total preorder t is unique following both reasoning
lines [19, 20, 21].
Optimistic reasoning is gravitation toward the best, namely each object in
O is put in the highest possible rank in t. On the other hand, pessimistic
reasoning is gravitation toward the worst, namely each object is put in the lowest
possible rank in t. Roughly, objects are rank-ordered following optimistic
reasoning w.r.t. the number of objects to which they are less preferred. In
our example a and c are each less preferred to none object, b and d are each
less preferred to one object while e is less preferred to 2 objects. Following
pessimistic reasoning objects are rank-ordered w.r.t. the number of objects
which they are preferred to. In our example c is preferred to 2 objects, a and d
are each preferred to one object, and b and e are each preferred to none object.
In AI preference reasoning optimistic reasoning is applied to negative prefer-
ences (called also rejections or constraints) [23]. The principle underlying such
preferences is “what is not excluded is desired”. Pessimistic reasoning is applied
to positive preferences which obey the principle “desired only what is explicitly
desired” [24, 23].
4.2.2 Indifference vs Incomparability
Now that we have stated the benefit of allowing flexible expressions of prefer-
ences in terms of partial preorders. It seems important to stress the distinction
between indifference and incomparability. In fact the distinction between the
two notions is not always understood. It is worth noticing that indifference is
an “information” that expresses equal preference between objects. On the other
hand, incomparability is “lack of information”. Therefore expressing indiffer-
ence is more constraining than expressing incomparability. The two notions
generally induce different results.
Example 7 (Example 6 continued)
In the previous example a and c were incomparable. Suppose now that they are
equally preferred w.r.t. p. Therefore we have p: a ≈ c  b, c  d  e.
Following optimistic reasoning we have t= (E1, E2, E3) = ({a, c}, {b, d}, {e}).
Following pessimistic reasoning we have t= (E1, E2, E3) = ({a, c}, {d}, {b, e}).
4.2.3 Optimistic or Pessimistic Reasoning for APB?
In an allocation system we aim at satisfying applicants’ preferences as best as
possible. Therefore we first try to allocate an applicant to her top preferred
studies w.r.t. her preferences list. If this is not possible then we look at im-
mediately less preferred studies, and so on. In Example 6 if a, b, c, d and e
were studies then the allocation system should first try to allocate a or c to the
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applicant. If none is possible then b and d should be considered. This reasoning
line is nothing but optimistic reasoning. Therefore in the rest of this presenta-
tion we consider optimistic reasoning to deal with partially ordered applicants’
preferences. Algorithm 3 provides a formal computation of t sketched in item
1 above (sub-Section 4.2.1).
Data: A set of objects O, a partial preorder p over O.
Result: A total preorder t= (E1, · · · , En) over O.
begin
S = {(o, o′) : o, o′ ∈ O, o p o′}
D = {(o, o′) : o, o′ ∈ O, o 6= o′, o ≈p o′}
l = 0
while O 6= ∅ do
l = l + 1
El = {oi|oi ∈ O,@oj ∈ O s.t. (oj , oi) ∈ S}
for each oi ∈ El do
if ∃(oi, oj) or (oj , oi) ∈ D and oj 6∈ El then remove oi from
El;
end
if El = ∅ then Stop (inconsistent preference statements);
from S remove (o, o′) if o ∈ El
from D remove (o, o′) if o, o′ ∈ El
from O remove elements of El
end
return (E1, · · · , El)
end
Algorithm 3: Computing a total preorder extending a partial preorder fol-
lowing optimistic reasoning
One may wonder whether expressing a partial preorder would not give ad-
vantage to applicants. For example let us just suppose that an applicant rank-
orders all studies first, assuming that she will have a better chance to get her
preferred study. This will possibly be the case if the applicant has revealed
her true preferences by equally rank-ordering these studies. If this is not the
case then she may be allocated to a study that she does not really prefer. This
is because, at a given stage, priority will be given to applicants who have less
choices, i.e. applicants who expressed more specific preferences (i.e. expressed
less equally preferred studies). Back to Example 5 C1 has precedence over C2
because she has only one preferred study, namely S1, while C2 has two preferred
studies, namely S1 and S2. An optimal allocation system would allocate S1 to
C1 and S2 to C2. Therefore both C1 and C2 get their preferred choice. Now if
C2 has not expressed her true preferences and, in reality, prefers S1, she will be
disadvantaged by expressing more equally preferred studies than necessary.
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4.3 Revised APB Algorithms
We have seen that allowing preorders in applicants preferences helps to dis-
tinguish between them. For non selective limited capacity institutions this is
crucial since APB relies on random decisions to separate equivalent applicants
(see sub-Section 3.2). Selective institutions are not impacted by random deci-
sions. Nevertheless they would definitely benefit from the flexibility offered by
partial preorders to express their preferences.
A total order is required by APB’s stable marriage procedure4 which must be
able to gradually exploit preferences lists to converge to a stable solution. Since
in general, applicants or institutions can produce disconnected partial orders as
their preferences lists, we have presented a general method to compute a total
preorder from partial preorders. Considering the intent of preferences expression
in APB, we came to the conclusion that optimistic reasoning should be preferred
to pessimistic reasoning while computing total preorders.
In the following we show how the use of total preorders as preferences lists
impacts the APB algorithm used to automatically create institutions/studies
preferences.
We need to generalize to total preorders the APB method which creates
institutions/studies preferences list according to applicants preferences. We
want to exploit the knowledge that at a given rank, if applicants a and b prefer
a study t but b has also indicated, at the same level, indifference with a study
t′, t will give priority to a.
Algorithm 4 generalizes the previous idea to increasing degrees of indiffer-
ence. It outputs for each study a total order on applicants. The constant
maxDisj reflects some limit on the size of a disjunction. Applicants are con-
sidered starting with the ones who gave more specific preferences (no or small
disjunction) first.
We focused in the previous sections on partial preorders which are the most
general form of preferences. Whatever students preferences list being partial
or total preorders, when considering these preferences to construct institu-
tions/studies preferences list over students the problem turns out to linearize
students preferences lists in the case they are in the form of partial preorders.
5 Related Work
The Stable Marriage problem is based on a very general notion of stability
which corresponds to allocations where no individuals can discern any gain
from further trade. It became central in cooperative game theory and found
applications in a variety of important real-life scenarios [26, 27]. As a recognition
of this large impact, the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Lloyd S.
4Remark that in many practical applications, a person may not wish (or be able) to choose
between alternatives. As a consequence, the Stable Marriage procedure presented in Section
1 has been extended to deal with these cases [25].
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Data: Institutions, list of institutions
Result: For each study s belonging to some institution i, s.Selected
preferences list of applicants
begin
for i ∈ Institutions do
for s ∈ i.Studies do
for r ∈ 1 .. 24 do // relative ordering
for a ∈ 1 .. 24 do // absolute ordering
for d ∈ 1 .. maxDisj do // disjunction size
locals = {app ∈ s.Applicants s.t.
app.Academy = i.Academy and
app.relative(s) = r and app.absolute(s) = a and
app.disj(s) = d // s referenced in
disjunction of size d }
randList = randomSort(locals)
add(s.Selected, randList)
end
end
end
for r ∈ 1 .. 24 do // relative ordering
for a ∈ 1 .. 24 do // absolute ordering
for d ∈ 1 .. maxDisj do // disjunction size
nonLocals = {app ∈ s.Applicants s.t.
app.Academy 6= i.Academy and
app.relative(s) = r and app.absolute(s) = a and
app.disj(s) = d // s referenced in
disjunction of size d }
randList = randomSort(nonLocals)
add(s.Selected, randList)
end
end
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 4: Create Institutions Preferences Using Indifference
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Shapley and Alvin E. Roth for the theory of stable allocations and the practice
of market design [28].
In the domain of education, a large number of U.S. metropolitan areas use
some variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm for high school admission. It all
started in 2004, when the New York department of education introduced an
applicant-proposing version of the Gale and Shapley algorithm for high school
admission. In these systems, total orders are used to express preferences [29].
Remark that they do not use randomness since institutions are legally entailed
to perform selection.
In Artificial Intelligence, several researchers considered the stable marriage
problem. In [30], the authors introduce a local search approach which exploits
properties of the problems to reduce the size of a state neighborhood. In [31],
male optimality and uniqueness of stable marriages for partially ordered pref-
erences are studied.
In the domain of Constraint Programming, [32] explores stability in different
problems variations including cases where men/women can rank members of
their own genders, etc. A constraint encoding of the SM problem with ties and
incomplete lists is presented and empirically evaluated in [33].
In the related field of Satisfiability, parallel solvers can solve, at scale, for-
mulae encoding these NP-complete problems, [34], [35], [36].
6 Summary and Conclusion
The Admission Post-Baccalaure´at Platform (APB) is used every year to allo-
cate hundreds of thousands first year students to more than twelve thousands
university degrees. This is done automatically by matching applicants prefer-
ences to university seats. In practice, APB can be unable to distinguish between
applicants through their expressed preferences, and as a consequence it can in-
troduce randomness in the matching process. This has created frustration and
incomprehension in the public since randomness, even applied as a last mean,
is hard to accept in a system used to decide about someone’s career. In this
work, we have provided a first solution to this problem. We have shown how
partial preorders can be introduced to improve applicants expressiveness and
consequently reduce exposure to random ordering. Moreover allowing partial
preorders permit applicants to postpone their definite preferences. In fact it may
be the case that an applicant hesitates between two or more studies in January
– when asked to express her preferences – but that her preferences become more
precise in June-July – when she has to state her final choice.
Since in general, applicants or institutions can produce disconnected par-
tial preorders as their preference lists, we have presented a general method
to compute a total preorder from partial preorders. Considering the intent of
preferences expression in APB, we came to the conclusion that optimistic pref-
erences reasoning should be favored to pessimistic reasoning while computing
total preorders.
Our solution has been thoroughly described using examples, theoretical anal-
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ysis, and new preferences processing algorithms. This was done to allow a quick
reuse in some future version of the APB platform. Remarkably, our work solves
both minister and applicants concerns. The former has officially acknowledged
as an objective the reduction of random choices [12], and the latter have often
raised their voices in public forums to criticize APB’s restricted expressiveness
and systematic use of randomness.
Although we focused on the APB application our proposal to use partial
preorders instead of total orders may be of interest in any preferences-based
matching procedures.
The initial ingredient in the APB platform is applicants’ preferences which
are total orders over (maximally) 24 studies. In this paper we extended appli-
cants’ preferences to deal with partial preorders thus permitting more flexibility.
Nevertheless it is well established that humans are generally cognitively unable
to provide such (pre)orders because of the cognitive effort required [37]. More-
over humans generally do not have prior preferences but construct them on
the fly [37]. AI researchers have addressed this problem. In particular instead
of asking humans to provide an explicit (pre)order over a set of objects, they
consider partial and compact humans preferences. Completion principles are
then used to compute the associated pre(order) [38, 39, 40, 4]. In a future work
we intend to extend the APB platform with elicitation of applicants compact
preferences as initial input.
In our societies, more and more decisions are going to be based on the output
of automated decision processes. APB is a striking example of these systems
whose lack of transparency has been heavily criticized. This has been exacer-
bated since it touches one of the last symbol of the French republican egalitarian
principle: the universal access to university for bacheliers. As a consequence,
the pressure put by parents, students, associations and their lawyers has forced
the minister to gradually open the black-box and give information on the un-
derlying APB algorithms. As AI researchers, we felt obliged to consider this
problem and to provide new algorithms which would improve the APB plat-
form. We hope that more AI researchers will consider the analysis of similar
systems whose decisions have direct societal impact.
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